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THOUGHTS ON THE ESTABLISHMENT OF STANDARDS
by
Ralph L. Keeney
The role of standards as I see it ｾ ｳ to promote decision making that
is ｾ ｮ the interest of the public. For instance, air pollution standards
might limit the sulfur content of fuels burned within a city or country.
Without these standards, some individuals may burn cheaper higher sulfur
fuels using the reasoning that "the little bit of sulfur dioxide
contributed by me can't hurt that much". However, if everyone uses the
high sulfur fuels, the general health of the public may deteriorate.
Hence, standards are enacted to prohibit this situation from occurring.
Usually standards specify maximum or minimum limits in terms of
either absolute amounts or flowrates. Examples of the former are
limitations on heights of builidngs and ability to withstand an earthquake
of specified magnitude. Under the latter are the air pollution standards
of "parts per million" and radiation dosages due to nuclear facilities.
This short note attempts to support the contention that standards
should be specified in light of (1) the public preferences and, (2) the
alternatives available. The implications of any alternative must ｡ ｬ ｜ ｾ ｡ ｹ ｳ
have some degree of uncertainty, so in this sense, my contention is that
standards should depend on preferences for and prohabilities nf ｴ ｨ Ｈ ｾ
consequences of the available alternatives. This particular viewpoint
will be explained in terms of a simple abstract example. The tho1Jghts
contained here are meant to illustrate some of the considerations and
relationships that I feel are important in establishing standards. They
are not meant as complete procedures for the process of setting standards.
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1. Notation
Let Xl' X2 , ... , ｾ be the attributes of interest to the public.
For insta.nce Xl may be a health index, X2 an economic ｩ ｮ ､ ･ ｸ ｾ etc. A
specific level of X. will be designated by x .. Thus a consequepc8 to] 1
the public may be Hritten 2::: (xl' x2 , "" ｾ Ｉ Ｎ The pllblic'R utility
functions is ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｌ and for now, we will neglect the substantial problem
of assessing this utility function. The point is that u is an appropriate
index for maximizing an expected value in selecting among alternatives.
We will designate alternatives by AI' A2 , •.. , A., '.', where in general,J
the number of alternatives may be infinite. The consequences of an
al ternative A. can be described by the prohability distribution p. (x) .
J 1 --
Standards serve to limit the alternatives available, and in
particular, they are established to "throw out" particnlarly hild
alternatives. Let us suppose we must select a standard Qk for society.
This standard will make 'previously feasible' alternatives A. illegal,
.1
and hence, eliminate them from further consideration. To be simple,
suppose that the selection of Qk restricts the feasible (i.e. the
legal) alternatives to the set AI' A2 , ••• Ｌ ｾ Ｎ Then the decision
problem of choosing a standard 1S shown in Figure 1. Of course, in
Figure 1 we have assumed complete compliance with the law which is a
simplification we will accept since it does not alter our il]l'strations.
2. The Impact of Standards
To make the discussion more concrete, let A. be the alte1"native
J
where a nuclear power plant 1S designed to emit no more than .i manrems
per year. Then, Qk can be the standard that a plant may emit a maximum
of k manrems per year.
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For this problem, suppose we have used society's utility function
ｵ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ and calculated the expected utility E [A.] for each alternative A.•
u J J
The results may be exhibited as in Figure 2a. In the absence of any
ｳ ｴ ｡ ｮ ､ ｾ ｲ ､ then the optimal alternative for society is clearly A .
max
Suppose a standard QL indicated in Figure 2b, was set such that
the fi!<1x.imum l('gal emission was L Inanrems per year. Then sine," the
feasible alternatives ai'e AI' A2 , .•. , AL, from Figure 2a, the best
alternative is clearly AL with expected utility Ell ｛ ｾ ｊ Ｎ Note that this
alternative is less desirable than the alternative A It has a
max
smaller expected utility. On the other hand, if standard QH of Figure 2b
is in force which allows plants designed to emit less than H manrems per
year, where H is larger than the emissions of alternative A ,then
max
A ｾｳ still clearly the best alternative. A graph of the expeeted
max
utility of the optimal alternative as a function of the ｳ ｴ ｡ ｮ ､ ｾ ｲ ､ Ｍ Ｍ ｳ ･ ｴ 10
this case as a ｭ｡ｸｾｭｵｭ emission level--is shown in Figure 2b.
So from Figures 2a and 2b, one fact is simply clear provided that
one is interested in selecting the alternative that is best for society.
If one has society's utility function as well as the implications of all
the alternatives, and if expected utility is to be used in ｳ ･ ｾ Ｚ ･ ｣ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｧ <'in
alternative, then standards can in no way improve upon the decision and
can in some circumstances actually force a suboptimal alternative to
be chosen.
The need for standards is created by the fact that the deciRioD
makers and influencial groups influencing a decision do not have intf'T.'csts
that coincide precisely with society's interests. In the terminology
used here, the utility functions of these individuals and groups may he
different from society's utility function u.
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Again to be over simplistic to make a point, suppose the body
which constructs and operates the nuclear power plants, referred to
here as the "operator", has a utility function ul ＨｾＩＮ The
"environmentalists" who wish to protect the ･ ｮ ｶ ｩ ｲ ｯ ｮ ｉ Ａ ｬ ｾ ｮ ｴ have utility
function ｵ Ｒ Ｈ ｾ Ｉ Ｎ The expected utilities of the alternatives Aj using
both ul and u2 are plotted in Figures 2c and 2d respectively.
What happens if society does not implement standards and allows the
group with utility function u l to make the decision? They should choose
the alternative Al indiciated in figure 2c since it has the highest
max
expected utility for them. Note however from Figure 2a that Al has
max
an expected utility for society that is far below that of A ,the best
max
alternative for society.
If this same group is allowed to make the decision, but it must
｣ ｯ ｮ ｦ ｯ ｲ ｾ ｭ to a standard QH' then again using the group's utility function
ul ' their optimal decision is found to ｢ ･ ｾ Ｎ Hence the utility
accruing to society by this decision is ｅ Ｉ ｾ ｊ , which is much better than
the E [AI ] that would have resulted with no standard. Well the point
u max
is probably clear, society should in this case put into effect a standard
ｾ as defined by Figure 2b.
Now let us consider what happens if group 2, the "environmentalists",
have the power to select an alternative. From Figure 2d, it is clear that
they should select alternative A2 • Note however that this ｾ ｩ ｬ ｬ obviously
max
lead to a utility E [A2 ] to society that is far below the maximum utility
u max
E
u
[A
ma
) for society. One might superficially argue "why can stronger
standards on radiation levels ,lead to worse social alternatives, certainly
less radiation is preferred to more radiation?" The reason, which we
will try to illustrate clearly by a more detailed example in the next
- 7 -
section, is that very low radi.ation levels will force poor performance
on other objectives (e.g. costs will become very high).
Consider the more realistic situation where standards will in fact
be established. Two of t.he powerful groups to be heard in the process of
setting the standards may be groups 1 and 2, Gronp 1. based on its analysis
1
summarized in Figure 2c, should fight for a standar.d greater than Q
rnax
as
this will then not hinder them if in fact they have the power to make future
decisions. Group 2, the 'environmentalifJts on the ot.her hand wOllld fight
a standard Q2 ,which still allows them to follo\v their optimum alternative
max
"AI.
max
However. if the' environmentalists' had any idea of the "Trower plant
builder's" preferences, they would realize that a standard A2 v70uld
max
also force the power plant builders to prefer option A2 to all their
max
available options.
The issues are probably reasonably clear. What would be ｢ ｾ ｳ ｴ for
society would be to establish two standards, a minimum and a maximum,
which are respectively, slightly less and slightly greater than the standard
o . This would limit anyone making decisions to select alternatives1nax
close to society's optimal alternative. But it doesn't seem narticularly
reasonable to put a minimum level on radiation levels, when AS we have
said, less ra.diation is always preferred to more. Other prO<""r\urc.s to
achieve the same effect are considered in the next section.
3. A Two-Dimensional Example
One of the crucial issues ｾ ｮ setting standards is tradeoffs--both
technological tradeoffs and preference tradeoffs. To illustrate this,
suppose only two attributes, call them X and Y, are important to society
- 8 -
and that society's utility function is u(x,y). Although we v:rill t'7or'k through
some of this example in the abstract, one specific context might be as
follows. The government, acting in society's ｩ ｮ ｴ ｾ ｲ ･ ｳ ｴ Ｌ is to establish
standards concerning nuclear power plant siting. The' ｮ ｪ ｶ ｾ ｲ Ｎ ｡ ｴ ｯ ｲ Ｇ Ｌ group 1,
and 'environmentalistS, group 2, are both involved :in scU:;nr; the st;mdards.
Once the standards are set, the operator ｾ ｳ permitted to site plants
where it wishes as long as they satisfy the standards. One can think of
attribute X as manrems per year and attribute Y as cost per kilowatt
hour of electri.city to the consumer.
Using our abstract model, the feasible consr"quence space ｾ ｮ the
absence of standards ｾ ｳ given in Figure 3a. A natural miniwlm for each
of the attributes is zero. However the attribute levels have no ohvioHs
ｭ ｡ ｸ ｾ ｭ ｵ ｭ ｳ Ｎ Three alternatives--or to be more specific, ｩ ｭ ｰ ｡ ｣ ｾ regions 0f
alternatives--are shown in Figure 3a also. With two attributes, a probability
distribution p.(x,y) is needed to specify an alternative A.. The circles
J J
are meant to indicate the region of X, Y space where p.(x,y) is non-zero
J
for any particular alternative. A technological tradeoff curve, indic<1.ted
by the dashed line, is also shown in Figure 3a. This curve h<1.s two
interpretations for our purposes. First, if one neglects uncertainty for
a moment--or from another viewpoint, after the uneertainty has been resolued--
the technological tradeoff curve says that if one has a consequence at one
point on the curve, it is technologically feasible to move to any other
point on the curve. However, our choice is between alternatives involving
uncertainty, so the technological tradeoff curve can be thought of as
indicating the locus of the expected values of x and y--assume probabilistic
independence--for the range of possible alternatives. Clearly, some of
- g -
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this is a bit simplistic, but we wish to illustrate some ideas here with
as few complications as possible.
Parts b, c, and d of Figure 3 indicate the preference tradeoffs of
society, group 1, and group 2 respectively. The solid lines are indifference
curves, and in all cases we will assume preferences are decreasing in
both attributes X and Y. That is, smaller x is preferred to larger x
and smaller y is preferred to larger y in all cases. Note that this
would be the case if X designated manrems per year and Y cost per
kilowatt hour.
Superimposed on Figures 3b, 3c and 3d is the technological
tradeoff curve, and what I've chosen to call the 'centroid' of the best
alternatives for society and the two groups. All of this is subject to no
standards. Given the preference structures of society and of groups 1
and 2 as indicated 1n Figure 3, one might calculate the respective
expected utilities for these three entities and find out they are just
as illustrated in ｆ ｩ ｧ ｵ ｲ ｾ Ｒ ｡ Ｌ 2c, and 2d respectively.
Essentially, Figures 2a, 2c, and 2d present plots of the expected
/
utility to the entity involved as the alternative moves along the
technological tradeoff curve. The 'essentially' is a qualifier because
uncertainty is neglect(·J in this interpretation, but the sense of the
statement should be clear.
The aspect about the I'ets of indifference curves in Figl1re :3 r'Jhich
preference ｴ ｲ ｡ ｯ ｾ ｾ ｦ ｦ ｳ Ｎ To clearly illustrate this let us assume the
utility functions of each of the three entities is of the same ｡ ､ ､ ｩ ｴ ｩ ｶ ｾ
form. Thus society's utility function is
u(x,y) (1)
- 11 -
where Ux and uy are utility functions over attributes X and Y respectively
with their origins at zero, and ｾ and ky are positive scaling constants.
Similarly, the utility functions for groups 1 an,} 2 are Ｂ ｾ ｾ ｨ ｾ form
1 ::: 1, 2, (2)
where i indicates the group. Furthermore, let us assume that the
conditional utility functions over the single attributes are ｾ ､ ･ ｮ ｴ ｩ ｣ ｾ ｬ
for all three entities as shown in Figure 4.
These utility functions are consistent with the indiffer"'l1ce curves
shown in Figure 3. The difference in these indifference cUr\:C,:, is provided
by the difference in the ratios lex/ley, ｫｾＯｾＬ and ｾ Ｏ ｾ Ｎ SpeLirically, to
be consistent with the indifference curves of Figure 3,
(3)
Thus, since the conditional utility functions are identical, He ｾ Ｎ ｡ ｮ
conclude that at any point (x,y). group 2 would be willing to allow Y
to increase more than society would in order to get a specified reduction
in X. Similarly. group 1 would be willing to allow X to increase more
than society would in order to reduce Y by a fixed amount. Again note,
all this might reasonably be consistent with X being radiation levels and
Y being energy cost.
Setting Standards on X
A normal practice followed in setting standards is to set a standard
for one attribute. Let us suppose a standard x 1S chosen which says
s
"It 1S illegal to have X levels (i.e. radiation) greater than X ".
s
This
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limits the alternatives as illustrated in Figure 5. Alternative Al 15
certainly legal since there is no possibility that the standard is
exceeded. On the other hand, alternative A4 will certainly lead to an
illegal level of X so it can be discarded. Alternatives AZ and A3 each
have a chance of ｲ ･ ｳ ｵ ｬ ｴ ｩ ｮ ｾ 10 a legal level of X. An 'operatnr' may consider
AZ to be a feasible option since it will very likely result in a 'legal'
consequence, whereas A3 would probably be rejected since an 'illegal' conse-
quence would likely result. In any situation, where an illegal consequence
did result, there would likely be an extra cost or some type of penalty
involved in altering the consequence to meet the standard.
Given that the rules as we have established them--that 1S, a standard
1S set by government and then group 1 makes decisions--the objective of the
\
government should try to set a standard to cause group 1 to select the
alternative leading to socie·ty'$ best alternative indicated in Figure 3b.
This is the same thing as setting the standard to lead to the alternative
A in Figure 2a. The problem raised in the last section was how to
max
protect oneself from too strong a standard on X.
It 1S clear from Figures 3d and Zd that group 2, if it had its own
way, would select a standard leading to A2
max
Such a standard would be
too strong from society's viewpoint and lead to an alternative less desirable
to society than A
max
But as we indicated, it seems unreasonable to
establish a minimum standard on X, stating in fact that radiation must
exceed a certain amount. Given the conditional utility function for X
as shown in Figure 4a--one in which all parties agree--a minimum standard
seems ridiculous.
y- 14 -
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We will suggest two ways to address this issue, joint standards on
X and Y and standards on society's preferences. Both of these approaches
get at the issue of society's preference tradeoffs between X and Y.
4. Setting Joint Standards on X and Y
Recall that the greater Y becomes, the more undesirable it 1.S to
society, as illustrated in Figure 4b. Given this, it may be reasonable
to set a maximum standard ys which says "It is illegal to have Y levels
(costs) greater than y ".
s
Figure 6 illustrates four ｰ ｯ ｳ ｳ ｩ ｢ ｾ ｬ ｩ ｴ ｩ ･ ｳ for the setting of joint
standards on X and Y. The situation in Figure 6a is about right for
society in the sense that the alternatives which remain feasible are
those with an expected utility very near to the expected utility of society's
optimal alternative. Figure 6b is the case where x 1.S too low (i.e. too
s
strict) and y is too high for society. It is the type of standards group 2
s
would obviously like, S1.nce it leaves as the only feasible alternatives,
those alternatives near optimal for group 2. The standards in Figure 6c
are just the reverse, x is too high and y too low. These are the
s s
standards that group 1 would like, because they promote alternatives close
to optimal for group 1. Basically, group 1 is willing to accept high leveL;
of X in order to keep Y low, whereas group 2 wants to keep the levels of
X down at the expense of Y. Society is between these two groups.
Figure 6d represents the interesting situation where both standards
are too stringent and no feasible alternatives exist. Such a situation
can result--and has resulted--from trying to establish standards independent
of the alternatives available. Looking at Figure 4, clearly we want both
- 16 -
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x and y to be as small as possible. However, the point is, that at some
point, further reduction of one can only be achieved at an increase 1n
the other. One must keep the technological tradeoffs, which are dictated
by the available alternatives, in mind when setting standards. One might
think of the technological tradeoffs as pushing the standards out (i.e.
dictating high maximum standards) and of the preferences and preference
tradeoffs as pushing the standards in (Le. dictating lower maximum
standards). The 'trick' is to balance these, which is clearly no mean task.
5. Standards on Society's Preference Tradeoffs
As an alternative to setting joint standards on X and Y, it may be
more reasonable to dictate, the legal preference tradeoff between X and
Y. Actually, what the government should do for society is just to
legalize its preference structure u(x,y), and then no standards would be
needed. We would have the situation as ｩ ｬ ｬ ｵ ｳ ｴ ｲ ｡ ｴ ｾ ､ in Figure 3b, and
society's best alternative should be chosen.
However, having said this, let us be a bit more realistir. and assume
that the government doesn't known society's utility function u(x,y), but
that it has some idea of society's preference tradeoffs indicated in
Figure 3h. If in addition, government has a good understanding of: th0.
technical tradeoffs near society's optimum alternative, then government
need not use the complete u(x,y) as a standard. Refer to Figure 7a where
we have duplicated Figure 3b and to Figure 7b which shows the same
technological tradeoff curve but with a set of linear indifference curves.
The point is that both sets of indifference curves lead to the
same decision, the optimum for society.
(a)INOIFFERENCE CURVE
FOR' SOCIET V
'CENTROID' OF SOCIETY'S
BEST ALTERNATIVE
LEGAL STANDARD
........------"- TRADEOFF
x
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To specify linear indifference curves only requires one constant,
the rate of substitution between X and Y. If one defines an x' and y' as
indicated in Figure 1b, then the rate of substitution between X and Y
is y'/x' which will be defined as A. This means that one is just willing
to let X increase by A units 1n order to reduce Y by one unit. Since
the specification of A defines the entire indifference structure indicated
in Figure 7b, government could set the standard that lithe legal rate of
substitution between X and Y is A". The standard that is best for society
is that implied by the line tangent to both the technological tradeoff
curve and society's indifference curve at the optimal alternative point
in Figure 7a.
Figures 7c and 7d respectively indicate the situation where the
legal tradeoff between X and Y is set too high and set too low. Group 1
would support the standard illustrated by Figure 1c and Group 2 \Jould
prefer a standard like that in Figure 1d.
6. ConclusiC'ns
In a society 1n which all public decisions are made for "the good
of society", no standards are necessary, if in fact, society's preferences
(i.e. utility function) are used in making decisions. The establishment
and adherence to standards 1n this case can never lead to improved decisions
for society. The argument 1S simple, with no standards, socic·ty's optimal
decision is taken, and since standards only reduce the number of alter-
natives, no 'better' decision can be found.
However, usually the people responsible for making decisions
affecting the public are not using society's utility function, but rather
they have their own set of preferences. Thus standards are ｳ ｾ ｴ to promote
- 20 -
this group to in fact choose society's optimal decision. The standards
attempt to eliminate all those alternatives which the decision making
group prefers to society's optimum, so that in fact, the best remaining
feasible (legal) alternative for the group is society's optimum.
In a two-attribute context, we examined the fairly typical process
of establishing a standard on only one attribute. This is often Qone by
considering only the impacts of var10US levels of that one attribute.
For example, in a nuclear power context, radiation standards specifying
maximum legal amounts might be set by considering only health impacts due to
various radiation levels, and neglecting other important factors such as
the cost of power and its impact on the quali.ty of life, depf'ndence on
foreign power sources, etc. Oversimplifying, primary effects are
considered, but secondary, tertiary, etc. effects are often neglected.
Our position is that standards should be set by considering
(1) the alternatives available (i.e. technological tradeoffs), and
(2) society's preferences structure (i.e. preference tradeoffs).
The alternatives, specified by probability distrihutions nver the p0ssible
consequences are meant to capture all the effects. The ｰ ｲ ･ ｦ ｣ ｲ ･ ｮ ｾ ･ ｳ are
needed to decide which set of possible effects, of those available, are
preferred.
The implications of two types of standards were investigated. ｆ ｩ ｬ Ｚ ｾ ｴ Ｎ
joint standards on the two attributes were considpred. Here. to ｒ ｮ ｭ ｾ
degrpe, the technological tradeoffs dictate the 'absolute' level of the
standards, and the society's preference tradeoffs are used to establish
the 'relative' levels these standards should have in orner to promotp the
- 21 -
The other type of standard concerned specifying society's 'official'
tradeoff between the attributes. The official tradeoff indicates how much
of one attribute one will give up to obtain a unit of the other attribute.
This standard is set, as illustrated in Figure 7a, by jointly considering
the technological tradeoffs and society's preference tradeoffs.
